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The aim of this study is to analyze the influence of the intentional income smoothing 
on the comparability of financial reports. Our sample is composed of 87 companies, 
considering quarterly periods from 2013 to 2017. For the measure of comparability, 
we opted the method of similarity of the accounting function presented by DeFranco, 
Kothari and Verdi (2011) and for the intentional income smoothing, we used two 
measures that capture different dimensions of income smoothing presented by Lang, 
Lins and Maffett, (2012). The data were analyzed using quantile regression. Our 
results indicate that intentional smoothing in fact impairs comparability. However, 
when we analyzed the intentional smoothing of results by accruals, we found evidence 
of a reflex on comparability only in the quantile that comprises the observations with 
the lowest comparability levels. For most companies analyzed, accrual smoothing is 
less detrimental to comparability than more general smoothing, which also includes 
operational smoothing. This aspect was observed by Sohn (2016) and may be related 
to the problem of operational management being more profound and persistent than 
management by accruals. .
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Este estudo objetiva analisar a influência da suavização intencional de resultados na 
comparabilidade dos relatórios financeiros. A amostra corresponde a 87 companhias, 
considerando períodos trimestrais de 2013 a 2017. Para o cálculo da medida de 
comparabilidade, optou-se pelo método da similaridade da função contábil de 
DeFranco, Kothari e Verdi (2011) e para mensurar a suavização intencional 
de resultados, utilizou-se duas medidas que capturam diferentes dimensões da 
suavização, apresentadas no trabalho de Lang, Lins e Maffett, (2012). Os dados 
foram analisados por meio da regressão quantílica. Os resultados obtidos indicam 
que a suavização intencional de fato prejudica a comparabilidade. Contudo, quando 
analisada a suavização intencional de resultados por accruals, houve indícios de 
reflexo sobre a comparabilidade apenas no quantil que compreende às observações 
com os menores níveis comparabilidade. Para a maioria das empresas analisadas, a 
suavização por accruals é menos nociva para a comparabilidade do que a suavização 
mais geral, que incluí também a suavização operacional. Este aspecto foi observado 
no trabalho de Sohn (2016) e pode estar relacionado ao problema de o gerenciamento 
operacional ser mais profundo e persistente do que o gerenciamento por accruals.
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Comparability is at the heart of the decision-making process for allocating capital to 
most financial report users. This study addresses a relevant aspect of this dynamic, 
the reflection of the income manipulation on the level of comparability of financial 
reports. By smoothing income, managers seek to show a position linked to lower 
levels of risk to investors and creditors. However, this type of manipulation impairs 
the ability to compare reports and, as a consequence, decreases information efficiency 
for the entire market.
Practical implications
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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial reports serve as an important means of communicating a company with its stakeholders. In 
these reports, managers are able to show the market a little of their strategies in the business environment, the risks 
of their companies and the return they can provide (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Profit stands out among the most popular information in the financial reports. Although profit is criticized 
in the financial market for having greater discretion compared to cash flow, it provides a picture of the company's 
economic-financial performance and serves as a decision parameter for a relevant range of investors and creditors 
(Ge, 2009). This same measure, which guides the investment decisions of external users, also serves as an internal 
performance metric, in addition to being used as a parameter to remunerate managers and other employees in an 
organization. 
Due to the profit relevance, the managers (responsible for providing the information) may have a particular 
interest in managing this performance measure with the purpose of meeting their own desires. According to Scott 
(2015), income management  has a wide range of justifications and effects on the quality of financial information. 
According to pioneers on the subject, such as Healy (1985) and Jones (1991), the conscious manipulation of 
financial information impairs its quality, contributing to increase informational asymmetry and transaction costs 
for the market.
One of the most popular and studied forms of income  manipulation is profit  smoothing (Ronen & Sadan, 
1981). According to Eckel (1981), there are two types of income smoothing. The first corresponds to natural 
smoothing , which depends on the flows of input and output of resources in an entity. The second consists of 
intentional smoothing , which derives from the manager's action in a deliberate attempt to alter these flows to fulfill 
a private objective. Gordon (1966) mentions that a way to smooth the results  is to build up reserves to reverse 
them in periods of falling profitability, failing to report the company's reliable performance. Doupuch and Drake 
(1966), on the other hand, describe that accounting methods with greater discretion have a natural tendency to be 
manipulated, that is, manipulation to smooth income is more feasible by accruals. 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) argue that when there are considerable impacts on results, the intentional 
income smoothing affects the quality of financial reports. Schipper and Vincent (2003), when considering the 
persistence of profits as one of the quality aspects of financial reports, argue that components of transience (such 
as intentional smoothing) decrease persistence of profits  and impair the quality of financial reporting. Additional 
empirical evidence indicates that smoothing  also undermines other measures of quality in financial reporting, 
such as conservatism (see Gassen, Fülbier & Sellhorn, 2006). Still, Lang, Lins and Maffett (2012) state that the 
intentional income smoothing is detrimental to transparency. Thus, the income smoothing can decrease the quality 
of financial reports and, thus, affect the costs of transactions in the financial markets, impacting the efficiency in 
the allocation of resources by the users of such information.
The decision-making process of external users is based on two main decisions: allocating capital, among 
the possible investment alternatives, and whether or not to continue with existing investments (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Based on these premises, we understand the investor's need to have access to the appropriate information 
level, with timely and quality information. Based on the financial information, users can assess the risks and 
returns of an investment and of others and, thus, compare which is the best alternative given their risk function. 
The comparability of financial reports stands out In  this decision-making environment. According to 
the Financial Accouting Standards Board (FASB) (2010), comparability is the ability of financial information to 
demonstrate what is equal or different between two individuals or, even, the same subject over time. Although it 
is not considered a main quality characteristic in the scope of accounting regulation (FASB, 2010), comparability 
is the foundation of any decision-making process that involves different investment alternatives and can directly 
affect transaction costs in a market economy (Kang & Stluz, 1997).
Research related to comparability indicate a series of advantages related to its presence, such as: ease of 
capital allocation between countries (Yip & Young, 2012; DeFond, Hu, Hung & Li, 2011; Fang, Maffett & Zhang, 
2015), a decrease in the cost of debt (Kim, Li, Lu & Yu, 2016) and an increase in the quality of analysts' forecast 
(DeFranco et al., 2011; Reina, Carvalho, Reina & Lemes, 2019).
Nevertheless, some theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to discuss the effect of income 
smoothing on the quality of financial reports (Schipper & Vincent, 2003; Gassen et al. 2006; Tucker & Zarowin, 
2006; Talebnia & Javanmard, 2011; Kolozsvari & Macedo, 2016; Al-Taie et al., 2017). Even so, few studies have 
specifically focused on the impact of profit management on comparability.
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Although research demonstrates a negative effect of earnings management on comparability (Sohn, 2016; 
Yang, Su, Zhou & Li, 2016; Chen & Gong, 2019; Ahmed, Neel & Safdar (2019), none of them tested smoothing 
as a management measure and, for the most part, were carried out only in developed markets. 
In Brazil, the study by Ribeiro, Carmo, Fávero and Carvalho (2016a) stands out, which analyzed the 
comparability and discretionary power of the manager. The authors conclude that greater discretionary power 
favors comparability in the sense of incorporating the different nuances of business models to accounting numbers. 
However, the authors did not analyze the negative discretion of accounting manipulation. In this research, the aim 
is to advance in this direction, analyzing the influence of the intentional income smoothing in the comparability 
of financial reports. 
The income smoothing can be a controversial issue when related to the comparability of financial 
information. Companies that smooth income can increase the uniformity of their financial reports and, with that, 
increase their comparability (although they are different constructs, there is a part that uniformity and comparability 
permeate, according to Ribeiro, Carmo, Fávero and Carvalho et al., 2016b). Studies such as those by Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) and Gassen et al. (2006) demonstrate that the income smoothing can have positive effects for the 
persistence of profits and, in turn, for the measures of conditional conservatism among companies from different 
countries, which in some way could bring a positive effect for comparability. 
On the other hand, the idea of “genuine” comparability (Ribeiro, 2014), would tend to suffer a loss with 
intentional smoothing, as companies would have limitations in showing their real performance. 
In this scenario, to achieve the proposed objective, the smoothing measures chosen were those presented 
in the work by Lang et al. (2012). For the measure of comparability we used the measure of the similarity of the 
accounting function developed by DeFranco et al. (2011). The data of the sample composed of 87 publicly-held 
companies were analyzed using a quantile regression. 
The results obtained indicate that intentional smoothing  in fact impairs comparability. This result shows 
that the intentional income smoothing is harmful to the market, as it can increase transaction cost and affect 
operation efficiently. 
However, when analyzing the intentional income smoothing of results by accruals, there was evidence 
of a reflex on comparability only in the quantile that comprises the observations with the lowest comparability 
levels. The positive effect, for the lowest levels of comparability, reflects the facet of informational dynamics in 
the market. 
For most of the companies analyzed, smoothing by accrual is less harmful to comparability than more 
general smoothing, which also includes operational smoothing. This aspect was observed in the work of Sohn 
(2016) and may be related to the problem of operational management being more profound and persistent than 
management by accruals.
It is more difficult for a manager whose intention, for example, is to reduce his profit, to decrease his sales 
revenue (since this is a generally low transitory element) than to temporarily increase his estimate of losses with 
bad loans. The point is that with the increase in vigilance over the actions of managers by the external auditors 
and corporate governance committees, they feel inhibited to smooth income by accruals. This reduction in the 
space to use accruals causes managers to resort to operational strategies to smooth their income, further damaging 
comparability, due to the greater persistence of the harmful effects of operational management (Zang, 2012).
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
In the regulatory view of accounting, comparability is a qualitative characteristic that makes enables to 
identify the similarities and differences between at least two items (FASB, 2010). These two items are related to the 
comparison reference, and can be different companies or the same company over time. More comparable financial 
reports are needed, as they reduce the cost of obtaining information and streamline the way it is processed by its 
users (Kang & Stluz, 1997). In a market economy, this characteristic can be considered a positive implication and 
generates benefits for users of information, for example, the decrease in transaction costs. 
In the academic view, comparability is linked to the idea that the accounting system is a mechanism 
that maps economic events (Simmons, 1967; DeFranco et al., 2011). This mapping system involves the stages of 
recognition and measurement, culminating in the disclosure of financial reports. The product of the mapping is 
profit, which incorporates managers' view of how economic events have affected an organization's assets within 
the assessed period. 
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This view of comparability was defined in the work by DeFranco et al. (2011), in which it is known as 
similarity of the accounting function. The view of comparability as an output measure (distinct from the view by 
inputs in the harmonization index models) was well accepted by the academy and is already a metric widely used 
to measure the phenomenon, in view of the large number of recent studies that used it (see Ribeiro, 2014).
The empirical studies that used the measure of comparability of DeFranco et al. (2011), different facets 
have already been analyzed. Among them are: the quality of the market analysts' forecast (DeFranco et al. 
2011), the ease of circulation of capital flow between markets in different countries (DeFond, et al. 2011; Barth, 
Landsman, Lang & Williams, 2012; Yip & Young, 2012; Brochet, Jagolinzer & Riedl, 2013), the reflection of 
different regulatory strategies (Ribeiro et al., 2016a) and how the measure is affected by earnings management 
practices (Sohn, 2016; Yang et al., 2016). 
Within the scope of this research, the works that come closest to the rationale employed here were 
developed by Sohn (2016) and by Yang et al. (2016). In the article by Sohn (2016), the objective was to test 
how comparability influences management practices by accruals and operations. The author found that the most 
comparable companies have less use of earnings management practices using discretionary accruals, but have 
greater use of earnings management through operations. Sohn (2016) states that there is a “leak” from accrual 
management practices to operational management when comparability is greater. 
The work by Yang et al. (2016), in turn, tested how the practices of managing operational results and by 
accruals affected the republishing of reports from Chinese companies and how this contributes to the comparability 
of the reports analyzed. The authors found results similar to those of the study by Sohn (2016), as they showed the 
antagonism in management practices by accruals and by operations. 
Yang et al. (2016) highlighted in their results, that companies, whose level of management by accruals is 
higher, tend to republish their reports more, which does not happen when management is done by operations. The 
authors also emphasize that the measure of comparability was positively impacted by the act of republication, that 
is, the greater transparency of the analyzed companies allowed greater comparability. This aspect was observed in 
Brazil in Ribeiro's thesis (2014), in which the adoption of IFRS and the effect on comparability were tested.
With regard to earnings management by intentional income smoothing, it is highlighted that this form of 
manipulation can be performed in two ways: by operations and by accruals. Both forms can be applied concurrently, 
although they are antagonistic (Zang, 2012). This antagonism between the management methods identified in the 
research by Zang (2012) makes perfect sense, because if the goal of smoothing is to achieve a specific objective 
(greater or lesser profit) when the manager uses more than one method, he/she must use less than another, since 
profit consists of cash flow plus accruals. 
Thus, according to previous studies, the existence of a negative relationship between profit quality and 
income smoothing practices is considered (Kolosvari & Macedo, 2016; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). Although 
researches demonstrate a negative effect of earnings management on comparability (Sohn, 2016; Yang, Su, Zhou 
& Li, 2016; Chen & Gong, 2019; Ahmed, Neel & Safdar (2019), none of them tested smoothing as a management 
measure and, for the most part, were carried out only in developed markets. Therefore, in this study we propose 
the following hypothesis, to be investigated:
H1: there is a negative relationship between the intentional income smoothing and the comparability of 
financial reports.
Smoothing has been extensively explored in the literature of the 1980s and 1990s (Eckel, 1981; Ronen & 
Sadan, 1981; Skinner & Myers, 1999; Bao & Bao, 2004), however not exhaustively, an example is the study by 
Ahmed et al. (2019). Measures of intentional income smoothing gained popularity in the early 21st century. The 
working paper  by Myers and Skinner (1999) - later published by Myers, Myers & Skinner (2007) - was one of the 
first to create a smoothing measure based on the logic of accruals, as defined in the work by Healy (1985). 
The measure by Myers and Skinner (1999), used in this study, is calculated through the correlation 
between total accruals and the operational cash flow. The logic of this measure is that cash flow represents the 
economic events that companies are subject to, and accruals are how managers interpret these events. Naturally, a 
negative correlation coefficient is expected between these measures, since profit is composed of both. If in a given 
period a company has a profit X, the higher the operational cash, the lower the items subject to accruals.
This measure is characterized by very strong negative correlations, where the managers' attempt to 
compensate the movement of cash flow is clear. In a practical way, this compensation can be made by discretionary 
items (such as estimates with losses on customers that can be constituted in one year and reverted in another), 
where the manager has room for manipulation.
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Another income smoothing measure, used in this research, represents a more comprehensive smoothing 
that is described in the work by Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003). This measure is based on the premise that only 
fluctuations in the result could identify smoothing. According to the authors, the smallest variation in profit would 
already be reason to suspect intentional income smoothing. The smaller the variation, the greater the propensity for 
smoothing practices. Although it is an interesting logic, this reasoning does not take into account different sectors, 
or different life cycles of a company, which could influence the variation in its profit. 
As a result of this limitation, Leuz et al. (2003) adapted the measure and also added the operational cash 
flow standard deviation, which in this design plays the role of the volatility of the economic events to which a 
company is subject. The measure uses the ratio of the net income standard deviation by the operational cash flow 
standard deviation. The lower the result, the greater the smoothing practices . The advantage of this measure, in 
relation to the measure that captures only the variation by accruals, is that it is able to capture the broadest smoothing, 
where operational practices can be employed - such as, 'burning' stock to increase revenue, and thus manage the 
results. It is worth noting that the two forms of earnings management used in this work are complementary since 
according to Zang (2012) there is a trade-off between operational management and accrual management. 
3 METHODOLOGICAL PATHWAY
The population of this research corresponds to all publicly traded Brazilian companies from Brasil Bolsa 
Balcão (B3). The initial sample consisted of companies that had information available on the return on their shares 
(necessary to calculate comparability) between 2010 and 2017. As a result, the initial sample consisted of 157 
companies. Subsequently, these companies were broken down according to the respective sector of economic 
activity, based on the North American Classification System (NAICS) sector classification. This classification 
was used because it is the most popular in works on comparability (Lang, Maffett & Owens, 2010, DeFranco et 
al., 2011, Yip & Young, 2012, Ribeiro et al., 2016a, Ribeiro et al., 2016b). From this selection, 31 sectors were 
identified.
Of these sectors, we chose those that were composed of at least four companies. This was necessary 
because according to Ribeiro (2014), the sector must be a control in the multivariate models of comparability. The 
author mentions that a minimum number of companies per sector is necessary, given that an analysis by sectors 
with few companies carries the degrees of freedom and, in turn, does not bring adequate variability to measure the 
measure of comparability. Given this restriction, it was found that of the 31 sectors, only 13 could be analyzed in 
the present study. As a result, the sample was composed of only companies from these 13 sectors, totaling a final 
non-random sample composed of 87 companies.
Data were collected when considering the quarterly periods from 2010 to 2017, as it comprises the period 
after the adoption of the IFRS standard in Brazil. It should be noted that the initial period of analysis corresponds 
to the first quarter of 2013, because to measure the measure of comparability and the measures of intentional 
income smoothing, it was necessary to use data that refer to the current quarter and the previous 11 quarters of each 
company. In addition, it is noteworthy that all this information was obtained through the Economatica® database. 
To maintain the characteristics that refer to the operations of the companies analyzed, especially when considering 
the comparability of financial reports in the same way as adopted in the work of Ribeiro et al. (2016a), Ribeiro et 
al. (2016b), Ribeiro, Sousa and Vicente (2019), the economic and financial data of this research come from the 
unconsolidated financial statements.
As for the basic models of the study, it is highlighted that for the calculation of the comparability of 
financial reports, the similarity of the accounting function, developed by DeFranco et al. (2011), the procedures 
used to calculate the comparability measure are shown in Appendix B, at the end of this study. To measure the 
measures that comprise the intentional income smoothing we used a technique similar to the work by Lang et al. 
(2012), the procedures used to calculate income smoothing measures are shown in Appendix A.
The dependent variable consists of comparability of financial reports (COMPM) and the variables of 
interest, which correspond to the intentional income smoothing measures, are SUAV1 and SUAV2. These two 
variables are complementary, when considering the logic presented in the work by Lang et al. (2012) and in the 
research by Zang (2012). Table 1 shows the dependent and independent variables of the multivariate model.
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Variable Description Operationalization References
Dependent variable
Comparability (COMPM) Comparability of individual sector peers ROAit = αi + βiRetornoit + εit DeFranco et al. (2011)
Independent variables
Variables of interest
SUAV1 General Intentional Income Smoothing
SMTH1it = αti + β1TAMit + β2DÍVIDAit + β3MBit + β4DPRECEITAit + 
β5%PREJUÍZOit + β6CICLOit + β7CRESCRECit + β8IMOBit+ β9FLUXOit + 
β10ANOit + β11SETORit+ εit
Lang et al. (2012)
SUAV2 Intentional Income Smoothing by Accruals
SMTH2it= αit + β1TAMit + β2DÍVIDAit + β3MBit + β4DPRECEITAit + 
β5%PREJUÍZOit + β6CICLOit + β7CRESCRECit + β8IMOBit + β9FLUXOit + 
β10ANOit + β11SETORit + εit
Lang et al. (2012)
Control variables
Degree of Operating 
Leverage (DOL)
Measure that represents a measure 
of operational performance of the 
company's cost structure
Gross Profit / (Gross Profit - Selling Expenses and Administrative 
Expenses)
Sohn (2016); Francis, Hanna e 
Vincent (1996); Ribeiro et al. 
(2016a) e Ribeiro et al. (2016b)
Market to book (MB) Variable that measures the business growth expectation for the market Market Value / Book Equity
Lee, Li e Yue (2006); Mcvay, 
Nagar e Tang (2006); Ribeiro 
et al. (2016a); Ribeiro et al. 
(2016b)
Size (TAM) Total assets of each company transformed to its logarithmic base Napierian Logarithm of the total asset
Watts e Zimmerman (1986); 
Doyle, Ge e McVay. (2007); 
Ribeiro et al. (2016a); Ribeiro et 
al. (2016b)
SECTOR Sector variable for each company based on NAICS level 2 classification
Dummy variable representing the sectors of economic activity of each 
company: (0) Auxiliary activities to transportation, (1) Construction of 
buildings, (2) Electricity, gas and water company, (3) Real estate, (4) 
Food industry, (5) Transportation equipment industry, (6) Yarn and fabric 
industry, (7) Paper industry, (8) Metal products industry, (9) Clothing 
industry, (10) Chemical industry, (11) Other industries, (12) Steel and basic 
metals industry.
Verrecchia e Weber (2006); 
Bagnoli e Watts (2010); Ribeiro 
(2014); Ribeiro et al. (2016a) 
Ribeiro et al. (2016b)
YEAR Variable that gives annual periods Dummy variable representing the annual periods from 2013 to 2017
Verrecchia e Weber (2006); 
Bagnoli e Watts (2010); Ribeiro 
et al. (2019a)
Source: prepared by the authors.
Tabela 1. Variáveis dependente e independentes utilizadas no modelo)
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The measure of comparability developed by DeFranco et al. (2011) of the similarity of the accounting 
function, considers that the price of a share reacts in a more timely manner to new information than accounting 
profit. This theory is known as price leads earnings and has been proven empirically by the works by Beaver, 
Lambert and Ryan (1987), Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) and Brugni, Fávero, Flores and Beiruth (2015). As 
the price incorporates the information in a more timely manner, it can serve as a proxy for the set of economic 
events of a certain company in a certain period. The profit, in turn, also incorporates the information reflected in 
the price, but only on a specific date (report publication) and after the information has been interpreted, processed 
and made available by the preparers to users. The model by DeFranco et al. (2011) manages to capture this 
dynamic and uses the economic event of one company in the accounting model of the other company to calculate 
comparability.
The first measure (SUAV1) for smoothing , presented by Lang et al. (2012), is the relationship between 
the variation in profit and the variation in operational cash flow. The variation in cash flow is a proxy for the 
variation in the company's economic flow, the lower this ratio, the greater the income smoothing, as the company 
seeks to adjust profit to reduce volatility. The second variable used (SUAV2) is the accrual smoothing measure, 
when calculating the correlation of total accruals in relation to operational cash flow. The lower the correlation, 
the greater the income smoothing, with -1 being maximum smoothing. It should be noted that the final smoothing 
measures were extracted from the residues of a model with the intention of controlling natural smoothing , that is, 
they are measures that capture intentional smoothing . The two smoothing measures represent different dimensions 
of management. 
The first measure is broader and measures the smoothing by accruals, as well as by operational aspects, as 
it considers the total variation in profit. The second measure, in turn, is more specific for manipulation by accruals. 
In the study by Zang (2012), the author indicates that there is a trade-off between management by accruals and 
management by operations. As a result, it was decided to use two measures for smoothing. The results found of the 
weak correlation between the measures in this research corroborate with Zang's (2012) thesis of complementarity 
of measures.
In addition to the dependent variable and the variables of interest, the multivariate analysis was composed 
of control variables (degree of operational leverage, market to book and size) that appear in the investigations by 
Ribeiro et al. (2016a) and Ribeiro et al. (2019). Control was also carried out by sectors and by year, since each 
sector has its specificities regarding the operational activities carried out, as well as the internal and external 
characteristics of the companies are not similar in all periods, given the changes to over time.
For the data analysis, quantile regression was used, with 20 replications, since the influence of the two 
measures of intentional income smoothing can be distinct throughout the comparability distribution. In addition, 
the impact of these two results manipulation strategies may be more significant depending on the company's level 
of comparability. Quantile regression was calculated using five quantiles, that is, 0.10; 0.25; 0.50; 0.75 and 0.90. It 
is worth remembering that, according to Greene (2000), quantile regression is based on the Minimizing Absolute 
Deviations (MAD) method and does not present the same assumptions as multiple linear regression. Thus, the tests 
of normality of residues, multicollinearity, serial autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are not necessary when 
performing multivariate analysis using quantile regression (Greene, 2000). 
This technique can assist in investigations that deal with the quality of accounting information, since it 
can enrich these scientific investigations due to the fact that the behavior of observations in extreme quantiles can 
be analyzed (Duarte, Girão & Paulo, 2017). In addition, Duarte et al. (2017) highlight that the quantile regression, 
as it is not based on the average, does not have the need to exclude outliers, as in models based on the average. 
In this sense, the total number of observations was 1,740, of which 193 comprise observations with insufficient 
information, which resulted in a final sample with 1,547 observations.
4 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 presents the information regarding the descriptive analysis of all quantitative variables in the 
multivariate model when considering each annual period.
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Panel A: descriptive statistics
Variables P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 SD Min. Max. Obs
COMP -6.457 -4.411 -2.542 -1.641 -1.135 2.642 -20.705 -0.387 1547
SUAV1 0.156 0.381 0.779 1.443 2.411 2.160 0.001 22.886 1547
SUAV2 0.041 0.108 0.226 0.385 0.558 0.194 0.001 0.967 1547
DOL -1.823 -0.034 1.485 2.499 4.315 18.641 -341.929 346.410 1547
MB 0.233 0.535 0.944 1.596 2.370 1.341 -14.960 23.657 1547
TAM 12.840 13.767 15.013 15.866 17.102 1.567 9.693 17.995 1547
Panel B: descriptive statistics for each annual period
2013
Variables P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 SD Min. Max. Obs
COMP -5.118 -3.311 -2.016 -1.405 -1.089 1.751 -8.983 -0.668 324
SUAV1 0.126 0.316 0.674 1.064 2.059 1.609 0.004 20.584 324
SUAV2 0.054 0.139 0.247 0.427 0.644 0.223 0.001 0.967 324
DOL -1.458 0.172 1.699 2.698 4.328 14.400 -99.107 178.368 324
MB 0.443 0.823 1.317 2.242 3.926 2.340 -14.968 23.657 324
TAM 12.706 13.745 14.892 15.749 16.671 1.551 10.801 17.701 324
2014
COMP -5.648 -3.580 -2.103 -1.467 -1.036 2.017 -14.737 -0.387 320
SUAV1 0.132 0.329 0.682 1.325 2.160 1.289 0.003 8.711 320
SUAV2 0.042 0.105 0.243 0.423 0.557 1.998 0.001 0.863 320
GAO -2.019 -0.173 1.481 2.462 4.304 27.459 -341.929 31.768 320
MB 0.233 0.542 0.968 1.552 2.072 0.697 0.037 3.718 320
TAM 12.840 13.728 14.966 15.734 16.952 1.534 10.973 17.769 320
2015
COMP -6.528 -4.172 -2.513 -1.823 -0.966 2.596 -19.379 -0.501 306
SUAV1 0.148 0.309 0.621 1.356 2.357 1.507 0.003 14.230 306
SUAV2 0.034 0.089 0.197 0.378 0.506 0.187 0.001 0.842 306
GAO -1.751 -0.087 1.363 2.468 4.289 5.487 -25.038 46.245 306
MB 0.174 0.402 0.723 1.332 2.111 0.968 0.013 6.114 306
TAM 12.957 13.858 15.132 15.848 17.135 1.558 10.342 17.999 306
2016
COMP -7.074 -5.230 -3.029 -2.230 -1.450 2.862 -18.573 -0.741 294
SUAV1 0.117 0.483 0.938 1.554 2.943 2.604 0.001 20.872 294
SUAV2 0.039 0.102 0.196 0.306 0.450 0.159 0.004 0.776 294
GAO -1.898 -0.156 1.323 2.078 4.355 6.159 -49.015 26.630 294
MB 0.196 0.449 0.742 1.289 2.191 0.843 0.017 5.145 294
TAM 12.981 13.896 15.071 15.895 17.142 1.542 10.185 17.917 294
2017
COMP -7.391 -5.826 -3.824 -2.020 -1.446 3.301 -20.705 -0.658 303
SUAV1 0.259 0.593 1.047 1.895 2.830 3.179 0.002 22.885 303
SUAV2 0.040 0.116 0.237 0.407 0.544 0.186 0.001 0.764 303
GAO -1.424 0.145 1.530 2.591 4.315 25.038 -135.650 346.418 303
MB 0.285 0.586 0.989 1.461 2.001 0.810 0.026 6.649 303
TAM 12.906 13.754 15.044 16.139 17.175 1.639 9.693 17.823 303
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Source: research data.
Legend: P10 = 10th percentile; P25 = 25th percentile; P50 = 50th percentile; P75 = 75th percentile; P90 = 90th percentile; SD = Standard-
Deviation; Min. = Minimum; Max. = Maximum, and; Obs. = Observations.
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The results of descriptive statistics reveal that the comparability median in Panel A was -2.542. This 
finding can be considered convergent with the studies by De Franco et al. (2011), Sohn (2016), Fang et al. (2015) 
Ribeiro et al. (2016a) and Ribeiro et al. (2019), as they presented an average level of comparability between -1.90 
and -2.70. However, the measures that represent the general intentional smoothing and the intentional income 
smoothing by accruals (SUAV1 and SUAV2) had a median of 0.779 and 0.226, respectively. Evidence that cannot 
be compared with the original measures by Lang et al. (2012), since the authors joined these measures. The bases 
for calculating SUAV1 and SUAV2 were SMTH1 and SMTH2 (not shown), which had a median of -0.659 and 
-0.275, respectively. The result of SMTH1 is similar to that of Lang et al. (2012), but the median value of SMTH2 
is at odds with the one presented. 
From this, it can be understood that Brazilian companies have a similar level of general income smoothing 
of companies in the main stock markets in the world, as analyzed by Lang et al. (2012). However, the level of 
smoothing by accruals is lower than that carried out in other countries and, therefore, in Brazilian publicly traded 
companies, this manipulation strategy may be less harmful to the quality of financial reports. It is worth mentioning 
that these inferences correspond to the level of general income smoothing and income smoothing by accruals that 
do not distinguish between the natural and intentional portion.
In a complementary perspective, when analyzing the descriptive results of the annual periods presented in 
Panel B, there is a drop in the level of comparability in all percentiles when considering the years 2017 and 2013. 
The decrease in the level of comparability in percentage terms in P10, P25, P50, P75 and P90 was 44.4%; 75.9%; 
89.7%; 43.7%, and; 32.8%, respectively. Evidence that is in agreement with that described by Ribeiro et al. (2019), 
given that there was a decrease in comparability when considering the post-IFRS implementation period. This 
evidence can complement the findings by Ribeiro et al. (2019), as the level of comparability has sharply decreased 
from the companies with the smallest to the companies with the highest levels of comparability.
As for the variation in the overall intentional income smoothing, it is noted that over the periods of 
analysis there was an increase in the use of this strategy of manipulating results. This is because in almost all 
periods - except for P25 and P50 in 2015, P10 in 2016 and P90 in 2017 - there was an increase in the overall 
intentional income smoothing in percentage terms. However, when analyzing SUAV2, there is a reduction in the 
use of accruals to smooth income by managers in all percentiles throughout the analyzed range. 
This aspect in the descriptive results corroborates the thesis raised by Zang (2012) that the management 
measures by accruals and by operations are antagonistic. Such behavior can demonstrate that governance 
mechanisms, such as statutory audit committees (implemented in a more recent period) and independent auditors, 
are inhibiting accrual management practices (Gaganis, Hasan & Pasiouras, 2016), forcing managers who want to 
manipulate results by smoothing resorting to practices related to operational issues.
After the descriptive data analysis, Pearson's correlation test was performed, even if it is not a necessary 
assumption for quantile regression, as mentioned by Greene (2000). A central point for carrying out this analysis 
is the fact that SUAV1 and SUAV2 can present multicollinearity, given that they capture manipulation strategies 
that are complementary to each other. The correlation coefficient between SUAV1 and SUAV2 was -0.0236, which 
demonstrates the complementarity of the measures. Furthermore, the results of the correlation analysis suggest that 
there is no multicollinearity between the independent variables, as they presented correlation coefficients much 
lower than 0.70, as suggested by Fávero and Belfiore (2017).
In this context, the next step was to perform multivariate analysis in quantiles for the comparability 
measure. Table 3 shows the results of factors related to the measure of comparability.
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Comparability
V
Quantile
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Coeff Est T Coeff Est T Coeff Est T Coeff Est T Coeff Est T
SUAV1 -0.676 -13.44*** -0.609 -26.06*** -0.332 -7.23*** -0.162 -4.74*** -0.137 -4.95***
SUAV2 1.016 3.73*** 0.113 0.70 -0.139 -0.93 -0.052 -0.52 -0.006 -0.06
DOL -0.001 -0.40 -0.002 -0.66 0.001 0.27 -0.001 -0.05 -0.001 -1.36
MB -0.054 -1.20 -0.04 -0.07 0.001 0.03 -0.040 -0.13 -0.017 -0.68
TAM 0.546 5.93*** 0.314 6.57*** 0.136 4.07*** 0.069 3.50*** 0.044 3.58***
Const. -13.157 -8.82*** -8.468 -9.03*** -5.297 -12.42*** -3.794 -13.61*** -3.089 -13.96***
SC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4799 0.4577 0.4181 0.3806 0.3731
Obs. 1.547
Table 3: Multivariate analysis of comparability
Note: V. Variables; Const. = Constant; SC = Sector Control; CP = Control of Annual Periods; Obs = Observations; * significance at the level of 10%; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
The abovementioned regressions were estimated using the non-parametric method in quantiles (0.10; 0.25; 0.50; 0.75 and 0.90). The constants of these econometric models absorbed the following variables: SECTOR = 
transport auxiliary activities and YEAR = 2013. The models were obtained based on the following equations:
COMPMit = β0 + β1SUAV1it + β2SUAV2it + β3GAOit + β4MBit + β5TAMit + β6CONSTRUÇÃOit + β7ELETRICIDADEit + β8IMOBILIÁRIAit + β9INDALIMENTOSit + β10INDTRANSPORTEit + β11INDTECIDOSit 
β12INDPAPELit + β13INDMETALit + β14INDROUPASit + β15INDQUIMICAit + β16OUTRASINDit + β17SIDERURGIAit + β182014 + β192015 + β202016 + β212017 + εit
Source: research data. 
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The findings in Table 3 demonstrate that SUAV1 is negatively related to comparability for all analyzed 
quantiles. SUAV2 (intentional income smoothing by accruals), however, presented a non-significant result for 
most of the analyzed quantiles and a positive and significant result for the quantile of companies with lower levels 
of comparability, that is, 0.10 quantile. 
This result indicates that, in general, the intentional income smoothing impairs the comparability of 
financial reports, corroborating the H1 hypothesis tested in this research, and with the works that point to a drop in 
the quality of information with the increase in intentional income smoothing practices. (Schipper & Vincent, 2003; 
Lang et al., 2012; Kolozsvari & Macedo, 2016). 
The fact that SUAV2 did not show a significant relationship in all quantiles with comparability, except in 
the 0.10 quantile that corresponds to the observations of companies with the lowest levels of comparability, can 
be explained from two logics. The first involves the trade-off  of operational and accrual management measures as 
found in Zang (2012). As companies used more aspects related to operational issues to smooth results (as seen in 
the behavior of SUAV1), naturally they used less accruals and, as argued by Zang (2012), operations management 
practices are more harmful to the quality of information than the manipulation practices based on accruals that are 
more easily reversed. 
The second justification involves the fact that the gain in uniformity is linked to the practices of income 
smoothing by accruals. According to Tucker and Zarowin (2006), income smoothing practices can increase profit 
persistence because they mitigate profit deviations and create a more constant flow of information. DeFranco 
et al. (2011) point out that there is a positive relationship between comparability and persistence. Uniformity 
and comparability are different measures, although they have an initial convergence, and in order to arrive at 
comparability it is necessary to have a minimum of uniformity in accounting practices (Ribeiro et al., 2016b). 
The less comparable companies, by using practices of intentional smoothing of results by accruals, end up 
standardizing their results, which, for less comparable companies, may have brought a gain to the measure. This 
was clear, as in the other quantiles there was no such effect. As genuine comparability is different from uniformity 
(Ribeiro et al., 2016b), the gain was restricted to the minimum contribution of uniformity that occurred only for 
companies that presented the worst measures.
It is worth mentioning that there are differences in the results corresponding to the T and R2 statistics 
between the analyzed quantiles. These differences show the impact on different levels of intentional smoothing on 
comparability. Understanding that can be justified when analyzing the T statistic of the five percentiles evaluated. 
The higher level of significance of the observations allocated in Model 1 and Model 2, than in the observations 
allocated in Model 4 and Model 5, indicates that the smoothing practices are more harmful to the comparability 
levels of the companies presenting the lower levels of this characteristic. This result is in line with the study by 
Sohn (2016).
5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This study aimed to analyze the influence of the intentional income smoothing on the comparability of 
financial reports. The results revealed that the general intentional income smoothing has a negative influence 
on comparability, from the companies with the smallest to the companies with the highest comparability levels. 
This result generates contributions to the discussions on the theme and corroborates the findings of the works by 
Schipper and Vincent (2003), Lang et al. (2012) and Kolozsvari and Macedo (2016) who found a negative effect 
of income smoothing on the quality of financial reports. From a practical point of view, intentionally smoothing 
income through operations can impair the comparability of financial reports, compromising the analytical power 
of investors, together with creditors, and negatively contributing to the efficient functioning of the market. 
Another piece of evidence that deserves to be highlighted is the sharpest decrease in comparability when 
managers perform general income smoothing in companies that already have the lowest levels of comparability. 
This more harmful reflection of the income smoothing in companies whose comparability is lower serves as a 
warning to the market of the opportunistic practices of managers in financial reports. In the theoretical perspective, 
this evidence is in line with the results obtained by Sohn (2016).
Finally, the results demonstrate the more perverse side of the income smoothing through operations 
and corroborates Zang's (2012) thesis. There is a trade-off  between accruals and operations management. As a 
possible explanation for this phenomenon, we highlight the improvement of control practices (such as the creation 
of statutory audit committees) and greater monitoring of external auditors under the way managers make their 
accounting choices (Gaganis et al., 2016). This meant that accrual smoothing practices were reduced  over time 
and in turn there was an increase in operations smoothing practices. 
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The result of the intentional income smoothing by accruals was not negative for comparability, on the 
contrary, for companies with the lowest levels of comparability, it presented a positive result, possibly due to the 
uniformity gain generated by the most homogeneous profit. This aspect was also observed by Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006), who reported an increase in profit persistence that were more smoothed out. However, this result needs to 
be analyzed with restrictions, since uniformity does not represent genuine comparability, as advocated by Ribeiro 
et al. (2016b). According to the authors, if uniformity is exacerbated, it can contribute negatively to comparability, 
since the idea of comparability is to identify what is equal, but also what is different. Uniformity only identifies 
what is equal. This aspect can bring a gain to measure when comparability is very low, even if it brings a loss when 
it already has an acceptable level.
This study was not without limitations, as like Ribeiro et al. (2016a) and Ribeiro et al. (2019), possible 
accounting policies that affect the comprehensive result were not considered, in addition to the research interval 
corresponding to a period of economic slowdown. In this sense, space is opened to analyze the reflection of 
other practices of manipulation of results in the comparability of financial reports. Additionally, it is suggested in 
future research to investigate the external reflexes, regulatory or macroeconomic environment, in this qualitative 
improvement feature .
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Appendix A
The intentional smoothing measures used in this research are included in the work by Lang et al. (2012). 
The authors present two ways to measure aspects of this form of result manipulation, called Smoothing 1 (SMTH1) 
and Smoothing 2 (SMTH2).
Lang et al. (2012) highlight that SMTH1 captures the volatility of profits in relation to operational cash 
flow in the period. Leuz et al. (2003) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2004), argue, that the more 
companies use accruals for earnings management purposes, the profit will be more smoothed compared to the 
final cash flows for the year. In this way, SMTH1 captures the income smoothing linked to accruals, as well as 
the company's operational issues. With this, it can be understood that this measure captures an aspect of the more 
general income smoothing.
Regarding the form of this measure, Lang et al (2012) describe that SMTH1 consists of the standard 
deviations of net profit before the extraordinary items at the end of the period with the standard deviations of 
operational cash flows at the end of each period, when using the range of the last three to five annual periods. 
However, with regard to SMTH1, an adjustment was made by using net income at the end of the period instead of 
net income before extraordinary items.
In this context, the interval of three annual periods was used, that is, twelve quarters, which comprises 
the current quarter plus the previous eleven quarters. After the SMTH1 calculation and, following the procedures 
performed by Lang et al. (2012), SMTH1 was multiplied by -1. This multiplication was necessary so that the 
highest values of the SMTH1 variable correspond to the highest levels of smoothing and, likewise, the lowest 
results comprise the lowest levels of smoothing. Thus, it makes the measure more intuitive by demonstrating that 
the higher the value of the measure (SMTH1) the greater the level of income smoothing. Given the information 
about the metric design, SMTH1 was calculated using Equation 1:
SMTH1 = (σLL / σFCO)* -1
Where: SMTH1 = general income smoothing; σLL = standard deviation of net income at the end of the 
12-quarter period, and; σFCO = standard deviation of operational cash flow at the end of the 12-quarter period.
SMTH2 is calculated based on the correlation between the operational cash flow at the end of the period 
divided by the total assets with the total accruals at the end of the period divided by the total assets at the end of 
the period. Lang et al. (2012) comment that when the correlation test of these two variables results in a negative 
coefficient, it indicates that there is a higher level of income smoothing by accruals. In which this central idea of 
this measure, is based on capturing the increased use of discretionary accruals in periods with reduced profits. If 
this movement persists over time, the correlation coefficient of the test will be negative. Thus, according to the 
logic of the equation described by Lang et al. (2012), Leuz et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2004), it is an indication 
that the company presents a smoothed profit through accruals.
SMTH2 was calculated from the correlation between the operational cash flow at the end of the period 
divided by the total assets in relation to the total accruals at the end of the period divided by the total assets at the 
end of the period in the current quarter and the last eleven previous quarters. It should be noted that the SMTH2 
variable was also multiplied by -1, according to the procedure performed by Lang et al. (2012). Multiplication 
necessary so that the second measure (SMTH2) also becomes more intuitive as to its interpretation, because with 
this multiplication, the greater the result of this measure, the greater the income smoothing by accruals.
SMTH2 = ρ[(FCO / AT),(Accruals / AT)]* -1
Where: SMTH2 = intentional smoothing of results by accruals; FCO = operating cash flow at the end of 
the 12-quarter period; AT = total assets at the end of the 12-quarter period, and; Accruals = total accruals at the end 
of the 12-quarter period.
With the measures that capture the general income smoothing and the income smoothing by accruals 
(SMTH1 and SMTH2, respectively) calculated. The next step was to submit these measures to Equation 3. From 
this equation, it was possible to separate the general intentional income smoothing (SUAV1) from the general 
natural income smoothing, in which these two added together comprise the overall total income smoothing 
(SMTH1). Likewise, with Equation 3, it was possible to distinguish the intentional income smoothing by accruals 
(SUAV2) from the natural income smoothing by accruals, that is, due to the company's operational activities. 
These two types of accrual smoothing ( natural and intentional) make up the total income smoothing by accruals 
(SMTH2). Thus, we proceeded to calculate SUAV1 and SUAV2, which correspond to the error term of the 
following multivariate models with SMTH1 and SMTH2, respectively, as the dependent variables, as shown in 
the study by Lang et al. (2012):
(1)
(2)
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SMTHit=αit + β1TAMit + β2DÍVIDAit + β3MBit + β4DPRECEITAit + β5%PREJUÍZOit + β6CICLOit +
β7CRESCRECit + β8IMOBit + β9FLUXOit + β10ANOit + β11SETORit + εit
Where: SMTH1 = general income smoothing ; SMTH2 = intentional smoothing of results by accruals; 
TAMit = logarithm of total assets at the end of year of the company i in period t;DÍVIDAit = total debt (short 
and long term loans and financing) at the end of the year divided by the total year-end assets of company i in 
period t;MBit = market to book at year-end of company i in period t; DPRECEITAit = standard deviation of net 
revenue for the year for the last twelve quarters (3 years) of company i in period t; % PREJUÍZO = proportion of 
the periods in which there was a negative net result in the last twelve quarters (3 years) of company i in period t; 
CICLOit = Operational Cycle logarithm (operational cycle = average storage time + average receipt time) end of 
year for company i in period t; CRESCRECit = revenue growth for company i in period t; IMOBit = fixed assets at 
the end of the year divided by the total assets at the end of the year for company i in period t;FLUXOit = average 
operational cash flow divided by the total assets at the end of year of company i in period t; ANOit = annual 
periods, from 2012 to 2017, and; SETORit = represents the economic activity sector of company i in period t;
After the determination of SUAV1 and SUAV2, Lang et al. (2012) performed the multiplication of 
these variables, which is called DIS_SMTHC, which corresponds to the manipulation of results from intentional 
practices of income smoothing. However, in this study we decided not to perform this procedure of multiplication 
of SUAV1 and SUAV2. Because, when considering the result of Pearson's correlation test, it appears that this test 
had a correlation coefficient of -0.0236. 
In this sense, these two variables, despite being similar, do not show the same behavior in the same period. 
A justification for this is linked to the form of smoothing used by managers according to the period. Because 
depending on the result of the year, the manager may choose to smooth the results based on general aspects, which 
even touch the company's operations, or use only accruals to smooth the results in the period. These two ways of 
manipulating results are different and, according to Zhang (2012), they complement each other, but are used by 
managers at different times according to the managers' purpose. From this, we chose, unlike Lang et al. (2012), to 
analyze the impact of the two income smoothing measures separately and not in a single variable.
After determining SUAV1 and SUAV2, the values corresponding to these variables – which comprise the 
residue from the estimation of SMTH1 and SMTH2 in Equation 3 – were transformed from their respective values 
in module. This transformation was necessary because the greater the distance of the error term in relation to the 
regression line, the greater the level of general intentional income smoothing and intentional income smoothing by 
accruals. Thus, in order to properly measure SUAV1 and SUAV2, it was necessary that the observations related to 
these variables be transformed into a module. In this way, all observations of these variables with negative values 
became positive and the observations of these variables that presented positive values continued with the same 
value. Therefore, the higher the value of SUAV1 or SUAV2, the greater the general intentional income smoothing 
and intentional income smoothing by accruals, respectively.
Appendix B
The measure of comparability consists of that developed by DeFranco et al. (2011), that is, the similarity 
of the accounting function. To this end, the accounting function of each company was initially estimated when 
considering the last 12 quarterly periods, according to the adaptations in Yip and Young's (2012) work when 
replacing the market value with the total asset. According to the authors, this adaptation also maintains the 
properties of the original work by capturing the reflections of economic events in the financial reports. In addition, 
this adaptation has also been used in other studies, such as that by Ribeiro et al. (2016a) and Ribeiro et al. (2016b). 
Thus, the role of each company was estimated according to the following equation:
ROAit = αi + βiRetornoit + εit
(3)
(4)
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Where: ROAit = quarterly net profit for the year on total assets at the end of the year company i in period 
t unconsolidated, and; Retorno it = final share return for the quarterly financial year of company i in period t, 
calculated from the closing price of common shares, adjusted for earnings and splits. Later, the parameters of the 
individual accounting functions were estimated when projecting the expected ROA [E (ROA)] of the companies, 
individually, based on the results of Equation 4. Thus, we have the equation for calculating [E (ROA)].
Where: E (ROA)iit = expected ROA of company i with the parameters of company i in period t, and; 
Retornoit = final share return for the quarterly financial year of company i in period t, calculated from the closing 
price of common shares, adjusted for earnings and splits. The next step was to calculate the expected ROA of the 
same company with the estimators of the other companies that are in the same sector, using the following equation.
Where: E (ROA)iit = expected ROA of company i with the parameters of company j in period t, and; 
Retorno it = final share return for the quarterly financial year of company i in period t, calculated from the closing 
price of common shares, adjusted for earnings and splits. 
When considering the economic event of a company with the estimators of the other companies in the 
same sector, the idea is that the constant economic event will continue. The measure of comparability of the 
companies consists of the average of the distance of the results obtained from the results of Equation 5 and 6, when 
considering the quarterly period interval, that is, [E (ROAiit) – E (ROAijt)]. DeFranco et al. (2011), argue that the 
closer the values resulting from these two functions, the greater the comparability between companies. In order 
to measure the comparability of the companies, when considering their peers, the average of the distance of each 
accounting function was calculated, in what gives the interval of the quarterly period from the following equation:
Where: Compbijt = measure of relative individual comparability of company i based on company j in 
period t; E (ROA)iit = expected ROA of company i with the parameters of company i in period t, and; E (ROA)iji 
= expected ROA of company i with the parameters of company j in period t.
The results of Equation 7 correspond to the average distances of the accounting functions of two companies 
belonging to the same sector. Thus, when calculating the average of the values resulting from Equation 7 regarding 
the comparability of companies' peers, we have the average of average comparability of each company, in which 
it is calculated from the following equation:
Where: COMPMitit = measure of comparability of each company in relation to its peers that belong to the 
same sector; Compbijt = measure of relative individual comparability of company i based on company j in period 
t, and; n = Number of companies in the sector.
As expressed above, adaptations were made to the original model by DeFranco, et al. (2011). These 
adaptations refer to the period interval, in which 12 quarterly periods were used instead of 16 quarterly periods 
as in the original work. Similar studies carried out adaptations of the original model, such as Yip; Young (2012), 
Cascino and Gassen (2012), Brochet, et al. (2013), and finally, Ribeiro et al. (2016a) and Ribeiro et al. (2016b).
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
